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31. Introduction
Why do mathematics and legal studies travel in such different directions; why is 
it that mathematicians and lawyers rarely take the time to speak to one another? 
Mathematics is based on axioms and abstract symbols, beautiful patterns  and 
elegant proofs, while law has traditionally been a linguistic game, one based on 
semantics, simple syllogisms, and reasoning by analogy.1  This paper, however, 
attempts to bridge the gap between these apparently disparate disciplines by 
looking at the process of litigation through the lens of probability theory.
It was over a century ago that Oliver Wendell Holmes first invited scholars to 
look at the law through this lens: ‘The prophecies of what the courts will do in 
fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law’.2 But Holmes 
himself and few other scholars have taken up this intriguing invitation. As 
such, in place of previous approaches to the study of law, this paper presents a 
non-normative, mathematical approach to law and the legal process. 
Specifically, we turn to Thomas Bayes, not William Blackstone, for inspiration 
and present a formal Bayesian model of civil and criminal litigation, or what we 
refer to as  the ‘litigation game’.3 That is, instead of focusing on the rules of civil 
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1 Compare, for example, the overview of mathematics  in Keith Devlin, Mathematics: The Science of 
Patterns  (Holt 1994) with the description of the methods of legal reasoning in Edward H. Levi, 
An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (UChicago 1949).
2 Oliver Wendell Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law’ (1897) 10 Harvard LR 457, 461.
3 The main reason we refer to the process of adjudication or litigation as  a game is to emphasize 
the interdependence of litigation outcomes. In summary, the outcome of a civil or criminal trial 
depends not only on the guilt or innocence of the defendant but also on the strategic moves 
made by the parties. For a vivid presentation of the idea of interdependence and a summary of 
strategic ploys, see Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Harvard 1960). To our 
knowledge, the first use of the term ‘litigation game’ appears in Marc Galanter, ‘Why the 
“Haves” Come Out Ahead’ (1974) 9 LSR 95, reprinted in David Kennedy and William W. Fisher, 
The Canon of American Legal Thought (Princeton 2006) 495-545.
4or criminal procedure or substantive legal doctrine, we ask and attempt to 
answer a mathematical question: what is the posterior probability that a 
defendant in a civil or criminal trial will be found liable, given that the 
defendant has, in fact, committed a wrongful act?
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: following this brief 
introduction, Section 2 briefly summarizes previous approaches to the study of 
law: legal formalism, legal realism, and economic analysis of law. Next, Section 3 
presents Bayes’ rule of conditional probability and explains the logic of the 
Bayesian or probabilistic approach to litigation, while Section 4 presents our 
formal Bayesian model of the process of adjudication, the litigation game. 
Section 5 concludes with a confession by the author.
2.  Brief summary of previous approaches to the study of law
Since the classical days of Christopher Columbus Langdell, Anglo-American 
scholars have produced three important intellectual movements, three Kuhnian 
‘paradigm-shifts’4  often referred to as legal formalism, legal realism, and 
economic analysis of law (or ‘law and economics’).5  Beginning with Dean 
Langdell, the so-called ‘legal formalists’ presented law and the legal system as a 
rational and self-contained logical system.6  Then came Oliver Wendell Holmes 
and the more radical ‘legal realists’, who, broadly speaking, saw law as  a form of 
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4  The influential idea of scientific revolutions (or ‘paradigm-shifts’) is set forth in Thomas S. 
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (3rd edn, UChicago 1996).
5 A general history of previous  legal scholarship is more fully presented in Kennedy & Fisher, 
The Canon of American Legal Thought (n 3) 1-12. See also Pierre Schlag, ‘Spam 
Jurisprudence’ (2009) 97 Georgetown LJ 803, 821; Richard A. Posner, ‘The State of Legal 
Scholarship Today’ (2009) 97 Georgetown LJ 845, 847.
6  This formalist view of law appears in the preface to Dean Langdell’s famous casebook, 
Christopher Columbus Langdell, Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts (Little Brown 1871) v-
vii.
5politics.7 Where the formalists  saw coherence and logical syllogisms, the realists 
saw politics and radical indeterminacy. But the realists and formalists shared 
the same fundamental flaw: they were unable to offer a workable and forward-
looking research agenda. The law-and-economics movement thus attempted to 
fill this academic void, although some scholars have persuasively argued that 
economic analysis as applied to law is just another form of legal formalism.8
Nevertheless, economic analysis of law not only offered a forward-looking 
research program for legal studies, economists also imported another important 
innovation to legal scholarship: the use of mathematics and mathematical 
methods in law. Economists, not lawyers nor mathematicians, thus played a 
leading role in systematically applying mathematical methods to law. Perhaps 
the most celebrated use of mathematics in legal studies is  found in the opening 
pages of Ronald Coase’s  landmark paper, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, in 
which Professor Coase presents a simple and straightforward arithmetical table 
to illustrate the reciprocal nature of negative externalities.9 Following Professor 
Coase’s famous arithmetical analysis of the problem of harmful effects, many 
economists, and even some legal scholars, have continued to apply ever-more 
sophisticated mathematical methods to legal problems.10
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7 Aside from Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law’ (n 2), another well-known statement of this position 
appears  in Judge William Andrews’s dissenting opinion in Palsgraf v Long Island RR Co [1928] 
248  NY 339, 162 NE 99 (Andrews J). See also Felix Cohen, ‘Transcendental Nonsense and the 
Functional Approach’ (1935) 35 Columbia LR 809.
8  See, for example, Arthur Alan Leff, ‘Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism about 
Nominalism’ (1976) 60 Virginia LR 451.
9 Ronald H. Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 JLE 1, 3.
10 For example, one of the leading proponents of the use of sophisticated mathematical models 
in law is  the economist Gary Becker, who has applied such methods to illuminate a wide range 
of legal fields, including criminal law, employment discrimination, and even family law. Gary S. 
Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior (UChicago 1976).
6For many scholars, however, the Achilles’ heel of the economic approach to law 
is  the ‘rational actor model’ of human behavior, the standard assumption of 
rationality. Broadly speaking, the law-and-economics literature tends to assume 
that legal actors have perfection information and are able to measure and weigh 
the benefits and costs of their actions, that is, that they are rational calculators 
of the expected utility of their decisions.11 In contrast, in this paper we abandon 
the rationality assumption through the use of Bayesian analysis. Furthermore, 
in place of previous approaches to the study of law, such as legal formalism and 
legal realism, we present a formal mathematical model of civil and criminal 
litigation. Before presenting our Bayesian model of the litigation game, we 
briefly explain the logic of Bayesian reasoning below.
3.  The Bayesian approach to litigation 
In contrast to previous approaches to legal studies, our approach is  Bayesian or 
probabilistic, since our model of the litigation game is derived from Bayes’ 
theorem or Bayes’ rule of conditional probability.12 In summary, Bayes’ theorem 
can be expressed in algebraic terms as follows:
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11  In defense of the rational actor model, it is worth noting  that economists generally assume 
that legal and other actors maximize their utility functions, not because this is a realistic 
assumption (it is  not), but rather to apply the methods of calculus and make economic analysis 
of legal problems mathematically tractable or, in the words  of one writer, ‘soluble’. Peter 
Medawar, The Art of the Soluble (Methuen 1967) 7.
12  The first description of Bayes’ ideas  appears in Thomas Bayes, ‘An Essay Towards Solving a 
Problem in the Doctrine of Chances’ (1763) 53 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 
of London 370. In addition, a comprehensive and useful survey of Bayes’ theorem appears in 
James Joyce, ‘Bayes’ theorem’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall edn, 2008) <http://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/bayes-theorem/> accessed 19 November 2011. In 
addition, a highly readable and simplified summary of Bayes’ contributions to probability theory 
may be found in Brian Everitt, Chance Rules (Springer 2008) 88-104.
7Pr(A|B) = ([Pr(B|A)] × [Pr(A)]) ÷ Pr(B)
Explained in words, Bayes’s formidable-looking formula may be broken down 
into the following five parts:
(i) The term on the left-hand side of the equation, Pr(A|B), refers  to the 
conditional probability (or posterior probability) of event A, given the 
occurrence of event B.
(ii) The right-hand side of the equation is  a fraction: the numerator 
contains two parts, Pr(B|A) × Pr(A), while the denominator consists of one 
term, Pr(B).
(iii) The first term in the numerator, Pr(B|A), refers to the conditional 
probability of event B, given the occurrence of event A.
(iv) The second term in numerator, Pr(A), refers to the prior probability (or 
unconditional probability) of event A, that is, the probability of A in the 
absence of any information about event B.
(v) Lastly, the denominator, Pr(B), is the prior probability (or unconditional 
probability) of event B in the absence of any information about event A.
In the remainder of this paper, we will equate the term ‘guilty’ (or the letter ‘A’) 
with the event that the defendant in a particular litigation game has committed 
a wrongful or unlawful act, that is, an act for which he should be civilly or 
criminally liable.13  In addition, we will equate the term the symbol + (or the 
letter ‘B’) with the event that the defendant is actually found liable at trial for 
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13  The term Pr(A) or Pr(guilty) (in contrast to the terms ‘A’ or ‘guilty’) refers to the prior 
probability in the absence of additional information that this event (i.e., the imposition of civil 
or criminal liability) has in fact occurred.
8the commission of a civil or criminal wrongful act.14  In other words, B or + is 
the probability of a positive litigation outcome from the perspective of the 
moving party in the litigation game, the plaintiff (in a civil trial) or the 
prosecutor (in a criminal trial). In other words, the main idea here is that the 
moving party—the plaintiff or prosecutor, as the case may be—obtains a 
favorable or positive outcome, which is  denoted by the symbol +, when the 
defendant is  found civilly or criminally liable at trial. Our Bayesian model of the 
litigation game thus poses the following fundamental question: what is the 
posterior probability that a defendant in a civil or criminal trial will be found 
liable, given that the defendant has not, in fact, committed any wrongful act?15
At this point, we must introduce and formally define the technical concepts of 
‘sensitivity’ and ‘specificity’. In the context of our Bayesian model of the 
litigation game, these concepts refer to the underlying reliability of a civil or 
criminal trial to distinguish between guilty and innocent defendants. Since civil 
or criminal liability should be imposed only on guilty defendants, i.e., 
defendants who have in fact committed an unlawful wrongful act, sensitivity 
and specificity are thus important values. Specifically, the ‘sensitivity’ of the 
litigation game—written as  Pr(B|A) or, in our model, Pr(+|guilty)—indicates how 
well a civil or criminal trial is able to correctly impose liability on guilty 
defendants. In summary, this measure is defined formally as the probability of a 
positive litigation outcome (i.e., liability imposed on the defendant, which 
represents a ‘positive’ outcome from the plaintiff’s or prosecutor’s perspective), 
given that the defendant being tried has actually committed an unlawful 
wrongful act.
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14 In other words, the symbol + and the term ‘positive litigation outcome’ is  not meant to convey 
a pro-plaintiff or pro-prosecutor bias; instead, we use it to indicate a litigation outcome in 
which civil or criminal liability is imposed on the defendant.
15  Like the term ‘litigation’, we define ‘wrongful act’ broadly to include both civil wrongs, such 
as torts and breaches of contract, as well as criminal wrongs, such as homicide and theft.
9By contrast, the ‘specificity’ of the litigation game, which may be written as Pr(–|
innocent), reflects how well a civil or criminal trial is  able to correctly screen 
out innocent defendants. This measure is defined formally as the probability of 
a negative litigation outcome (i.e., no liability imposed on the defendant, which 
represents a ‘negative’ outcome from the perspective of the moving party, 
plaintiff or prosecutor), given that the defendant has not committed a wrongful 
act.
Before presenting our Bayesian model in section 4 below, we wish to make three 
general points about Bayesian reasoning in general. First, the basic idea behind 
Bayes’s theorem is the idea that the conditional probability of event A, such as a 
defendant being found liable, given the occurrence of another event B, the 
defendant’s commission of a wrongful act, not only depends on the strength of 
the relationship between A and B; it also depends on the prior probability of 
each event. Thus, according to Bayes’s theorem, the probability that a defendant 
in a civil action will be found liable (for tort, breach of contract, etc.), given that 
a plaintiff has  brought an action against the defendant, will generally depend 
on two sets of probabilities: (i) the likelihood of the defendant being found 
liable given the strength of plaintiff’s claim, and (ii) the prior probabilities or 
success rates of plaintiffs and defendants generally.
Secondly, notice that the probability of some event A conditional on some other 
event B is not the same as the conditional probability of event B given event A, 
or stated formally: Pr(A|B) is  not equal to Pr(B|A).16 For example, the probability 
that a defendant will be found civilly or criminally liable, given that the 
defendant has committed some wrongful act (the commission of a tort, a breach 
of contract, a crime, etc.), is not the same as the probability that the defendant’s 
wrongful conduct will result in liability, given that the plaintiff brings an a civil 
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16 This point is also made in Everitt, Chance Rules (n 12) 90.
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or criminal action against the defendant. We will explore this idea further in 
section 4 below, when we present our Bayesian model of the litigation game.
Lastly, it is also worth noting that our Bayesian model of the litigation game 
does not rely on any unrealistic assumptions about human rationality, nor does 
it require any detailed information about any particular rules of procedure or 
about substantive legal doctrine. Since such procedural rules  and legal 
doctrines are often unclear, contested, and subject to manipulation,17  one can 
begin to appreciate the advantage of the Bayesian approach to civil and criminal 
litigation. In place of hunches, verbal arguments, and the inevitable ‘thrust and 
parry’ of competing interpretations of indeterminate rules and doctrines,18  our 
Bayesian approach to the litigation game attempts  to understand the legal 
process from a probabilistic perspective.
4.  The model
Here, we present a stylized Bayesian model of the litigation game. To do so, we 
make a number of simplifying assumptions about the litigation process. First, 
we define ‘litigation’ broadly to include both criminal and civil cases. In 
essence, the litigation game (whether civil or criminal) is a contest in which the 
moving party, the plaintiff or the prosecutor, attempts to impose civil or 
criminal liability on the defendant for the commission of an unlawful or 
wrongful act (whether civil or criminal in nature). And likewise, seen from the 
defendant’s perspective, litigation is a contest in which defendants attempt to 
avoid the imposition of liability. Our model thus presents litigation as a game 
with two possible outcomes: (i) positive and (ii) negative (hence the term, 
‘litigation game’). Specifically, a positive outcome occurs when the moving party 
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17 See, for example, Gordon Tullock, The Logic of the Law (Basic Books 1971) 48-49.
18 Karl Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition (Little Brown 1960) 522-529.
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successfully imposes civil or criminal liability on the defendant; a negative 
outcome, when the defendant is able to avoid the imposition of liability.19
Before proceeding, notice that the relevant rules  of procedure (i.e., the rules of 
the litigation game)—as well as  the scope and legal meaning of ‘wrongful acts’ 
and the types of legal liability imposed on wrongful actors—are not relevant 
and are thus extraneous to our simplified model. In place of traditional legal 
analysis, our model abstracts  from the morass of legal materials  and takes these 
features of the legal landscape as a given. Stated formally, these details are 
exogenous or external to our model. Having stated our simplifying 
assumptions, we now proceed to apply Bayes’ theorem to the litigation process. 
Recall the statement of Bayes’ rule from the previous section of this paper:
Pr(A|B) = [Pr(B|A) × Pr(A)] ÷ Pr(B)
Translated into the language of our model of the litigation game, Bayes’ rule 
may now be restated as follows: 
Pr(guilty|+) = [Pr(+|guilty) × Pr(guilty)] ÷ Pr(+)
In other words, we want to find the posterior probability, Pr(guilty|+), that a 
defendant will be found liable at trial, given that he or she has actually 
committed some wrongful act. Ideally, of course, liability should be imposed 
only when a defendant has actually committed a wrongful act, and conversely, 
no liability should be imposed on innocent defendants.20  But in reality, false 
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19  As an aside, we note that our Bayesian model of the litigation game ignores the temporal 
dimension of adjudication (‘time costs’ and the problem of delay); instead, we assume for 
simplicity that litigation is an instantaneous event, like a coin toss  or the roll of a die. For a 
deeper exploration of the problem of time scarcity, see F.E. Guerra-Pujol, ‘Time Scarcity and 
the Problem of Social Replicants: Clones and the Coase Theorem’ (forthcoming) 2 JLSD.
20  In an ideal or perfect legal system, the value for Pr(guilty|+) should be equal to or close one. 
Stated formally, Pr(A|B) ≈ 1.
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negatives  and false positives will occur for a wide variety of reasons, such as 
heightened pleading standards and abuse of discovery in civil actions and 
prosecutorial discretion and prosecutorial misconduct in criminal cases.21 
Stated colloquially, some guilty defendants will be able to avoid the imposition 
of liability, while some innocent ones  will be punished.
Our Bayesian approach to the litigation game takes into account both (i) the 
possibility of a false positive (i.e., the imposition of liability when the defendant 
has not committed any wrongful act) as well as (ii) the possibility a false negative 
(no liability even though the defendant has, in fact, committed a wrongful act). 
The purpose of our stylized model, however, is  not to explore the many systemic 
imperfections—procedural or practical or otherwise—in the existing legal 
system, imperfections contributing to the problem of false positives and 
negatives. This  well-worn path has been explored by many others.22 Instead, the 
goal of our model is to solve for Pr(guilty|+) and answer the following key 
question: how reliable is the litigation game, that is, how likely is  it that a 
defendant who is found liable is, in fact, actually guilty of committing a 
wrongful act?
We will consider four possible scenarios or types of litigation games in the 
remainder of this paper: (i) non-random adjudication with risk-averse or 
‘virtuous’ moving parties, (ii) non-random adjudication with risk-loving or ‘less-
than-virtuous’ moving parties, (iii), random adjudication with risk-averse moving 
parties, and (iv) random adjudication with risk-loving moving parties. This 
schema may thus be depicted in tabular form as follows:
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21 In the context of the litigation game, a false positive or Type I error occurs when a defendant 
who has not committed a wrongful act is  nevertheless  found liable for the commission of such 
act. By contrast, a false negative or Type II error occurs when a tortious or guilty defendant is 
able to avoid the imposition of liability.
22  See, for example, Galanter, ‘Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead’ (n 3); see also Tullock, The 
Logic of Law (n 17).
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Type of litigation game Type of moving party
non-random adjudication risk-averse
non-random adjudication risk-loving
random adjudication risk-averse
random adjudication risk-loving
In summary, the adjudication variable in our model refers to the reliability or 
screening effectiveness of the process of adjudication. Specifically, ‘non-random 
adjudication’ refers to litigation games that are 90% sensitive and 90% specific, 
an assumption based on the classic and oft-repeated legal maxim ‘it is better 
that ten guilty men escape than that one innocent suffer’.23  Random 
adjudication, in contrast to non-random adjudication, occurs when litigation 
games are only 50% sensitive and 50% specific and thus no more reliable than 
the toss of a coin.24  As an aside, it is worth asking, why would the process of 
adjudication ever produce a ‘random’ outcome in the real world? One 
possibility is that the level of randomness or unpredictability of adjudication 
might be a function of the level of complexity or ambiguity of legal rules. 
Consider, for example, the ‘reasonable man’ standard in tort law: the more 
complex or ‘open-textured’ the rules  of substantive and procedural law are, the 
more random the litigation game will be.25  Also, before proceeding, notice that 
the adjudication variable can never be 100% sensitive nor 100% specific since 
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23 4 Bl Comm 358, quoted in Eugene Volokh, ‘N Guilty Men’ (1997) 146 U Penn LR 173.
24  With respect to trials with two possible outcomes (e.g., positive and negative, or heads and 
tails), by definition a random outcome cannot occur with more nor with less than 50% 
probability. We thank our research assistant, Sydjia Robinson, for pointing out this observation 
to us.
25 See HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn, Clarendon Press 1994); see also Gordon Tullock, 
The Logic of the Law (n 17) 48-49. For further exploration of this topic, see F.E. Guerra-Pujol, 
‘Chance and Litigation’ (forthcoming) 21 Boston U Public Interest LJ.
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errors are inevitable in any process of adjudication, regardless of the litigation 
procedures that are in place. 
In addition, the term ‘risk-averse’ or ‘virtuous’, as  applied to moving parties, 
refers to plaintiffs and prosecutors who play the litigation game only when they 
are at least 90% certain that the named defendant has committed an unlawful 
wrongful act, while ‘risk-loving’ or ‘less-than-virtuous’ moving parties refers to 
plaintiffs and prosecutors who are willing to play the litigation game even when 
they are only 60% certain that the named defendant has committed a wrongful 
act. Stated colloquially, virtuous plaintiffs are civil plaintiffs who rarely file 
frivolous claims and criminal prosecutors  who rarely abuse their discretion; by 
contrast, less-than-virtuous moving parties are more willing to gamble on 
litigation games than their more virtuous colleagues.
4.1  Non-random adjudication with risk-averse moving parties
Suppose the litigation game is 90% sensitive and 90% specific, that is, suppose 
the process of litigation is able to determine correctly, at least 90% of the time, 
when a defendant has committed a wrongful act, and suppose further that the 
process  will also determine correctly, again at least 90% of the time, when a 
defendant has not, in fact, committed a wrongful act. The intuition behind this 
assumption (non-random adjudication) is that reliable legal procedures will 
tend to produce just and fair results.26  Of course, the existence of reliable 
adjudication procedures in which liability is  imposed only on guilty defendants 
is  not a sufficient condition for justice. When a defendant has broken an unjust 
or unfair law (licensure requirements and racial segregation laws quickly come 
to mind), justice would be better served by an unreliable adjudication 
procedure (i.e., by not enforcing the unjust or unfair law in the first place). But 
putting aside the underlying meaning of justice, such a litigation game appears 
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26  Henry M. Hart and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process (William N. Eskridge and Philip P. 
Frickey eds, Foundation 1994).
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to be a highly accurate one, since it will correctly determine with 90% 
probability, or nine times out of 10, whether the defendant has  or has not 
committed a wrongful act, an essential precondition before liability may justly 
be imposed.
Nevertheless, even in the absence of unjust laws, our model of non-random 
adjudication still suffers  from a 10% error rate. Given this error rate, we must 
turn to Bayes’ rule to determine the posterior probability that liability will 
nevertheless be incorrectly imposed on an innocent defendant, that is to say, 
the probability that a defendant who has not committed a wrongful act will be 
incorrectly classified as a wrongful or guilty defendant. To apply Bayes’ 
theorem, we must find the prior probability that any given defendant, selected 
at random, has in fact committed a wrongful act. What is this prior probability? 
First, let the term ‘guilt’ stand for a guilty defendant, let ‘innocent’ represent an 
innocent defendant, and let the + symbol indicate the event of a positive 
litigation outcome for the plaintiff or prosecutor, as the case may be. That is, 
from the plaintiff or prosecutor’s  perspective, a positive outcome, or +, occurs 
when liability is  eventually imposed on the defendant. We now proceed to find 
the values for Pr(+|guilty), Pr(+|innocent), Pr(guilty), Pr(innocent), and Pr(+). To 
begin with, Pr(+|guilty) is the probability that a guilty defendant will be found 
guilty at the end of a litigation game. Since we have assumed that the litigation 
game is  90% sensitive, the value for Pr(+|guilty) is equal to 0.9. By the same 
token, Pr(+|innocent), the probability that a particular litigation game will 
produce a false positive (i.e., the probability that liability will be imposed on an 
innocent defendant) is equal to 0.1. This value is 0.1 since, given our initial 
assumptions, the litigation game produces false positives only 10% of the time.
Now suppose that plaintiffs and prosecutors are risk-averse or virtuous parties, 
that is, assume that plaintiffs and prosecutors alike are willing to play the 
litigation game only when they are at least 90% certain that the named 
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defendant has, in fact, committed an unlawful wrongful act.27 Accordingly, given 
these stringent assumptions (i.e., risk-averse moving parties and non-random 
adjudication), the prior probability that a given defendant is  guilty is  90%, or 
stated formally, letting A stand for the prior probability of being guilty, then Pr
(A) = Pr(guilty) = 0.9. Summing up, Pr(A) or Pr(guilty) is  the prior probability, in 
the absence of any additional information, that a particular defendant has 
committed a wrongful act. As stated above, this term is equal to 0.9 since we 
have assumed that 90% of all named defendants are guilty. Likewise, we 
determine Pr(B) or Pr(innocent), the prior probability that a particular 
defendant has not committed any wrongful act. This is simply 1 – Pr(guilty) or 
0.1, since 1 – 0.9 = 0.1.
Lastly, Pr(+) refers to the prior probability of a positive litigation outcome—
again, ‘positive’ from the plaintiff’s or prosecutor’s perspective—in the absence 
of any information about the defendant’s guilt or innocence. This value is found 
by adding the probability that a true positive result will occur (0.9 × 0.9 = 0.81), 
plus the probability that a false positive will happen (0.1 × 0.1 = 0.01), and is 
thus equal to 0.81 plus 0.01 = 0.82. Stated formally, Pr(+) =[Pr(+|guilty) × Pr
(guilty)] plus [Pr(+|innocent) × Pr(innocent)]. That is, the prior probability of a 
positive litigation outcome, Pr(+), is the sum of true positives and false positives 
and, given our assumptions above, is equal to 0.82 or 82%.
Having translated all the relevant terms of Bayes’ theorem, we now restate our 
Bayesian model of litigation game and find the posterior probability, Pr(guilty|
+), that civil or criminal liability will incorrectly imposed on a guilty defendant 
(i.e., the probability that a defendant who has not committed a wrongful act will 
nevertheless be incorrectly classified as a wrongful or guilty defendant):
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less willing than their risk-loving  colleagues to gamble on the outcome of litigation, or 
expressed in legal language, virtuous civil plaintiffs rarely file frivolous claims and virtuous 
criminal prosecutors rarely abuse their discretion. The reader may rest assured, however, that 
we will relax these unrealistic assumptions later.
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Pr(guilty|+) = [Pr(+|guilty) × Pr(guilty)] ÷ Pr(+)
= [Pr(+|guilty) × Pr(guilty)] ÷ ([Pr(+|guilty) × Pr(guilty)] + [Pr(+|innocent) × Pr
(innocent)])
= (0.9 × 0.9) ÷ [(0.9)(0.9) + (0.1)(0.1)]
= 0.81 ÷ 0.82 = 0.988
In other words, given our rosy assumptions above, the outcome of any 
particular litigation game will be highly accurate. Specifically, the probability 
that a defendant who is found liable for a wrongful act is actually guilty of 
committing such wrongful act is close to 99%, a value that appears to vindicate 
Hart and Sacks’s optimistic vision of legal process, though there is still a 1% 
probability that an innocent defendant will nonetheless be found liable. But 
what happens when the litigation game is played by strategic plaintiffs or 
zealous prosecutors? That is, what happens when plaintiffs file a greater 
proportion of frivolous claims (relative to the optimal level of frivolous claims) 
or when prosecutors routinely ‘overcharge’ criminal defendants with extraneous 
or vague offenses (e.g., conspiracy)? We turn to this possibility below.
4.2. Non-random adjudication with risk-loving moving parties
Suppose the litigation game is  still highly sensitive and specific as before (i.e., 
90% sensitive and 90% specific), but that plaintiffs and prosecutors are risk-
loving or less-than-virtuous actors. Specifically, assume that the moving parties 
are willing to play the litigation game even when they are only 60% certain 
(instead of 90% certain, as we assumed earlier) that the named defendant has 
committed a wrongful act.28  The intuition behind this revised assumption is 
that, in reality, the litigation game might be played by litigants (as well as judges) 
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with the defendant’s actual guilt than a risk-averse or virtuous moving party.
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who are engaged in rent-seeking and self-serving behavior.29  Thus, with risk-
loving moving parties, the prior probability, Pr(guilty), that a given defendant is 
guilty is now only 60%, while the prior probability, Pr(innocent), that a 
particular defendant has not committed a wrongful act is 1 – Pr(guilty), or 1 – 
0.6 = 0.4. Stated formally: Pr(guilty) = 0.6, and Pr(innocent) = 0.4.
Next, we find the probability that a guilty defendant will be found guilty, or Pr(+|
guilty). In this  variation of our model, the value for Pr(+|guilty) is equal to 0.90 
since we continue to assume the litigation game is  90% sensitive. Pr(+|
innocent), the probability that a particular litigation game will produce a false 
positive (i.e., the probability that liability will be imposed on an innocent 
defendant), remains 0.1. Lastly, recall that Pr(+) is  the probability that a true 
positive result will occur (in this case, 0.9 × 0.6 = 0.54), plus the probability that 
a false positive will happen (0.1 × 0.4 = 0.04), and is thus equal to 0.54 plus 0.04 
= 0.58. Stated formally, Pr(+) =[Pr(+|guilty) × Pr(guilty)] plus [Pr(+|innocent) × Pr
(innocent)] = 0.54 plus 0.4 = 0.58. 
Given these revised assumptions—non-random adjudication and less-than-
virtuous plaintiffs—we now find the posterior probability that liability will be 
correctly imposed on a guilty or wrongful defendant as follows:
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Ahead’ (n 3) and Gordon Tullock, The Logic of the Law (n 17). In principle, a more hard-core 
‘risk-loving’ moving party might be willing to gamble on the litigation game even when he or 
she is only 50% certain of the outcome. Nevertheless, we assume that a risk-loving moving party 
requires a 60% probability of a positive litigation outcome simply because he or she must 
expend resources to play the litigation game. Put another way, since the litigation game is not 
costless—a point made in F.E. Guerra-Pujol, ‘Coase’s  Paradigm’ (2011) 1 Indian JLE 1, 27-32; 
see also Galanter, ‘Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead’ (n 3)—and thus, broadly speaking, the 
higher the cost of playing  the litigation game (relative to the resources of the moving party), the 
more risk-averse an otherwise risk-loving moving party will be.
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Pr(guilty|+) = [Pr(+|guilty) × Pr(guilty)] ÷ Pr(+) 
= [Pr(+|guilty) × Pr(guilty)] ÷ ([Pr(+|guilty) × Pr(guilty)] + [Pr(+|innocent) × Pr
(innocent)])
= (0.9 × 0.6) ÷ [(0.9)(0.6) + (0.1)(0.4)]
= 0.54 ÷ 0.58 = 0.931
In this case, despite the presence of risk-loving moving parties, the outcome of 
any particular litigation game will still be highly reliable. Specifically, although 
there is a 7% chance that an innocent defendant will be found liable, the 
posterior probability that a defendant who is found liable for a wrongful act is 
actually guilty is  still 93%, a value that, once again, appears to affirm the Hart 
and Sacks vision of the legal system.30  But now, consider what happens when 
litigation is a crapshoot, that is, stated formally, what happens when the 
litigation game is only 50% sensitive and 50% specific?
4.3  Random adjudication with risk-averse moving parties
Suppose now that the litigation game is only 50% sensitive and 50% specific. In 
other words, suppose litigation games are completely random.31  Under this 
seemingly unusual scenario, the process of adjudication is no better than a coin 
toss. Although this assumption may appear fanciful, as  we explained earlier,32  
the randomness of adjudication might be a function of the level of the 
complexity or the level of ambiguity of the applicable legal doctrines  (e.g., 
assumption of risk) or procedural rules (e.g., res judicata). In plain English, the 
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31 To this end, consider the following statement by one of the author’s favorite professors in law 
school: ‘Litigation is a crapshoot’. John Langbein, Sterling Professor of Law and Legal History, 
Yale Law School (New Haven, Conn). The author does not recall the precise date when this 
proposition was made, but this statement, like Holmes’s prediction theory of law, has had a 
profound influence on our thinking about the legal process. For an empirical exploration of the 
randomness of litigation, see F.E. Guerra-Pujol, ‘Chance and Litigation’ (n 25).
32 See text accompanying notes 24 and 25.
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more complex or ambiguous the applicable law is, the more random or arbitrary 
the outcome of litigation will be. 
In summary, random adjudication produces purely random results, no better 
than a coin toss, since it will correctly determine with one-half probability, or p 
= 0.5, whether the defendant has or has not committed a wrongful act. Given 
this inherent randomness, along with the presence of virtuous or risk-averse 
moving parties, we now turn to Bayes’ rule to determine the posterior 
probability that liability will be incorrectly imposed on an innocent defendant 
(i.e., the probability that a defendant who has not committed a wrongful act will 
be incorrectly classified as a wrongful or guilty defendant). Again, let ‘guilt’ 
stand for a guilty defendant, ‘innocent’ an innocent defendant, and the symbol 
+ the event of a positive litigation outcome for the moving party (plaintiff or 
prosecutor). Next, we find the values for Pr(guilt), Pr(innocent), Pr(+|guilt), Pr(+|
innocent), and Pr(+).
First, assuming that plaintiffs and prosecutors are virtuous or risk-averse actors 
and thus are willing to play the litigation game only when they are at least 90% 
certain that the named defendant is guilty, then Pr(guilty), the prior probability 
in the absence of other information that a particular defendant has committed a 
wrongful act, will be equal to 0.9, or stated formally, Pr(guilty) = 0.9. Likewise, Pr
(innocent), the prior probability in the absence of other information that a 
particular defendant has not committed a wrongful act, is simply 1 – Pr(guilty) 
or 0.1, since 1 – 0.9 = 0.1 
Next, Pr(+|guilty), the probability that liability will be imposed on a defendant 
who is actually guilty, is 0.5 since the litigation game in this  variation of our 
model purely random (i.e., 50% sensitive). Similarly, Pr(+|innocent), the 
probability that liability will be imposed on an innocent defendant, is also 0.5 
since, given our revised assumptions, the litigation game will produce a false 
positive half of the time the game is played.
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Lastly, recall that Pr(+) is the sum of true positives and false positives, that is, the 
prior probability of a positive litigation outcome, positive from the plaintiff’s or 
prosecutor’s perspective, in the absence of any information about the 
defendant’s guilt or innocence. Specifically, given our assumptions above, this 
value is equal to 0.5, that is, 0.5 × 0.9 = 0.45 (true positives) plus 0.5 × 0.1 = 0.05 
(false positives). Thus, the prior probability of a positive litigation outcome, Pr
(+), absent any information about the defendant’s guilt or innocence, is equal to 
50%.
Thus, given random adjudication and virtuous or risk-averse plaintiffs, we apply 
Bayes’ theorem as follows:
Pr(guilty|+) = [Pr(+|guilty) × Pr(guilty)] ÷ Pr(+)
= [Pr(+|guilty) × Pr(guilty)] ÷ ([Pr(+|guilty) × Pr(guilty)] + [Pr(+|innocent) × Pr
(innocent)])
= (0.5 × 0.9) ÷ [(0.5)(0.9) + (0.5)(0.1)]
= 0.45 ÷ 0.50 = 0.9
This result is perhaps the most surprising one thus far. Even when the litigation 
game is  a purely random process, no better than a coin toss, the outcome of any 
individual litigation game will still be highly reliable, given the presence of 
virtuous moving parties. Specifically, under this scenario there is  a 90% 
probability that a defendant who is found liable for a wrongful act is, in fact, 
actually guilty. 33Although this  value is less than the corresponding values for Pr
(guilty|+) in the previous two permutations of the model (subsections 4.1 and 
4.2 above), this difference is marginal at best, considering the enormous 
qualitative differences between non-random adjudication and a purely random 
legal system. The present permutation of the model, however, assumes the 
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that an innocent defendant will be found guilty or civilly or criminally liable.
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presence of virtuous plaintiffs and prosecutors. What happens when the 
litigation game is  purely random and the moving parties  are less-than-virtuous? 
We explore this intriguing possibility in subsection 4.4 below.
4.4  Random adjudication with risk-loving moving parties
Now suppose the litigation game is still a crapshoot but that plaintiffs and 
prosecutors are risk-loving or ‘less-than-virtuous’; that is, assume that the 
moving parties are more willing to gamble than their virtuous colleagues. 
Specifically, we will assume that the litigation game is 50% sensitive and 50% 
specific and that plaintiffs and prosecutors are willing to play the litigation 
game even when they are only 60% certain that the named defendant has 
committed a wrongful act. Although these assumptions do not appear to be 
plausible, this permutation of our model, however implausible, may 
nevertheless provide an instructive counter-factual or hypothetical illustration 
of our Bayesian approach to litigation.34
Given our revised assumptions (i.e., random results and risk-loving or less  than 
virtuous actors), we once again turn to Bayes’ theorem to determine the 
posterior probability that liability will be incorrectly imposed on an innocent 
defendant (i.e., the probability that a defendant who has not committed a 
wrongful act will be incorrectly classified as a wrongful or guilty defendant), 
and once again, ‘guilt’ stands for a guilty defendant, ‘innocent’ indicates an 
innocent defendant, and the symbol + represents the event of a positive 
litigation outcome for the plaintiff or prosecutor.
As such, in the absence of any additional information or evidence, Pr(guilty), the 
prior probability that a particular defendant has committed a wrongful act, is 
equal to 0.6, while Pr(innocent), the prior probability that a particular 
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picture the litigants as pure gamblers.
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defendant has not committed a wrongful act, is 0.4 (i.e., 1 – Pr(guilty), or 1 – 0.6). 
Next, Pr(+|guilty), the probability that liability will be imposed on a defendant 
who is  actually guilty, and Pr(+|innocent), the probability that liability will be 
imposed on an innocent defendant, are both equal to 0.5 since, given our 
assumptions, this version of the litigation game is purely random. Lastly, Pr
(+),the sum of true positives and false positives, is also 0.5 since, given our 
assumptions above, 0.5 × 0.6 = 0.3 (true positives) and 0.5 × 0.4 = 0.2 (false 
positives), or put another way, the prior probability of a positive litigation 
outcome (again, from the plaintiff’s or prosecutor’s  perspective), absent any 
information about the defendant’s guilt or innocence, is equal to 50%.
Therefore, given random adjudication and risk-loving plaintiffs, we now apply 
Bayes’ theorem as follows:
Pr(guilty|+) = [Pr(+|guilty) × Pr(guilty)] ÷ Pr(+)
= [Pr(+|guilty) × Pr(guilty)] ÷ ([Pr(+|guilty) × Pr(guilty)] + [Pr(+|innocent) × Pr
(innocent)])
= (0.5 × 0.6) ÷ [(0.5)(0.6) + (0.5)(0.4)]
= 0.3 ÷ by 0.5 = 0.6
What is most surprising about this result is the ability of the litigation process 
to produce reliable results more than half the time, even when the underlying 
litigation game itself is purely random and even when the actors are less than 
virtuous. Specifically, the probability that the outcome of any individual 
litigation game will be accurate is  60%, even though the underlying litigation 
game is purely random, no more reliable than a coin toss. One way of 
explaining this potential paradox is to take another look at the Pr(guilty) term: 
the prior probability in the absence of additional information that a defendant 
selected at random is guilty (i.e., the prior probability that a particular 
defendant has committed a wrongful act). This prior probability term exerts a 
decisive influence in the fourth permutation of our model precisely because the 
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outcome of litigation is  purely random. That is, when litigation is a crap shoot, 
or to be more precise, when litigation is a coin toss, both the prior and posterior 
probabilities of the defendant’s guilt are the same. Here, since Pr(guilt) = 0.6, 
then Pr(+|guilty) = 0.6.
5. Conclusion
We wish to close this paper with a confession. Ex ante, before researching and 
writing this paper, we took a dim view of the litigation game. Given the 
complexity and ambiguity of substantive as well as procedural rules, the 
indeterminate nature of most legal standards, and the high levels  of strategic 
behavior by both litigants and judges, we expected our Bayesian model to 
confirm this  negative view of the legal process. Ironically, however, the results of 
our Bayesian model of the litigation game are still surprising. In essence, they 
show that, regardless of the operative rules of procedure and substantive legal 
doctrine, ‘positive’ litigation outcomes (as defined in this paper) are nevertheless 
a highly reliable indicator of a defendant’s guilt. Specifically, our model 
demonstrates that when a defendant is found guilty of committing a wrongful 
act (civil or criminal), there is a high posterior probability that the defendant 
actually committed such wrongful act, even when the underlying process of 
adjudication is random and even when the moving parties are risk-loving or 
less-than-virtuous.
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